Jump to: , Tor is a distributed 'onion' network, that makes it more difficult for an adversary to track any one peer on the network.Tor also is very useful to access the 'uncensored' internet in countries such as China and Iran.Preserving privacy means not only hiding the content of messages, but also hiding who is talking to whom (traffic analysis).Tor provides anonymous connections that are strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis.Bitcoin can run easily on the Tor network.Contents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 todo explain: onion routing (how tor network helps to anonymize), encryption used, exit nodes, routers Please follow the instructions provided with installation files and read the list of warnings.Tor doesn't magically anonymize all your traffic just because you install it.Down the page you can find examples how to configure applications to use Tor to anonymize the origin of your traffic.This is a detailed installation guide for Windows.

Before you setup Bitcoin or mIRC to use Tor, please install Tor and start in.On the taskbar of your compute you'll see a small green onion when Tor is running.See also Bitcoin Core instructions for Tor Once you have your Tor client up & running, you can configure your Bitcoin client to use it.Select in menu Settings -> Options Check "Connect through socks 4 proxy" with the address 127.0.0.1 and port 9050 (the Tor default port number) Configuring an application to use Tor is also called to torify it.(needs a brief howto here) the note about bitcoin-otc promote on a more appropriate place in this page?reference to trading and IRC Conducting business using bitcoin-otc can be done more anonymously when directly connected to a Freenode IRC hidden service.Run bitcoind with -proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 (or whatever your SocksPort is).bitcoind will detect that you are using a proxy on 9050 and will force the "nolisten" flag.If you are not running tor on 9050, you need to set "nolisten" manually otherwise you will listen on your public IP and possibly reveal that you are running a node.

Hidden services run within the Tor network and can be connected to using the -connect= parameter to bitcoind so long as bitcoin is configured to use a Tor proxy.Bitcoin users do not need to use hidden services, since Tor can be used to increase anonymity of normal internet traffic, including bitcoin connections, but there are some technical reasons why hidden services may be beneficial; for more information see the Tor project's documentation.Services are listed at Fallback_Nodes#Tor_network along with instructions for using them.Some mining pools are available as a hidden service on the tor network.Any pool can be reached over tor.The general methodology here is to tell your mining client to use your local Tor proxy.This is client specific but there are some helpful hints.Any client can have its traffic routed via Tor by using the torify command and invoking the miner with that.Another method is to set the http_proxy environment variable as some miners use libraries which support that.

It is possible to set the http_proxy environment variable as some miners use libraries which support that.yum bitcoinmIRC is a popular IRC client.reddit bitcoin paper walletThis is a guide how to connect to Freenode IRC using Tor + SASL + mIRC.ethereum elementFreenode only allows SASL authenticated users to connect to the onion IRC server.SASL authentication works only with a registered nickname.Connect to Freenode IRC without using tor & execute /msg nickserv register You will see something like this -NickServ- An email containing nickname activation instructions has been sent to -NickServ- If you do not complete registration within one day, your nickname will expire.To finish your nick registration go the provided email and copy/paste the command from e-mail to irc.

Download the SASL.dll and sasl.mrc files and copy them to your mIRC installation directory Load sasl.mrc script (Alt + R to open script editor, Ctrl + L to load file, browse to sasl.mrc, press OK or "save & exit").Type /dialog -m SASL.main SASL.main to open the SASL connection manager.Username and NS Password must match your nickserv reservation.Auth Type can be PLAIN Add the entry for Freenode onion IRC server Configure mIRC to use a Proxy (your local Tor proxy) Now you should be able to connect.Bitcoin forum where this topic is discussed Unlike Freenet, I2P, etc., Tor's security is very well-defined.While weaknesses do exist (described below), they have been known since Tor was created, and new weaknesses of significance are not expected.Tor sends TCP packets over 3 (normal) or 7 (hidden services) Tor relays.This is why it is so slow: your packet might have to go through 100 computers (counting Internet routers) before it reaches its destination.Tor uses multiple layers of encryption that are pulled away for each node.

Hence the name The Onion Router, which is always capitalized as Tor, and never TOR or t.o.r.I first select three Tor relays that I know about.Then, I send a message to my ISP that looks like this: When Relay1 receives this, he decrypts the payload using his private key.The payload contains this: Relay3 receives the real TCP payload, which he sends to the destination: The payload is not and can not be further encrypted by Tor.However, if the protocol itself uses encryption (HTTPS, SSH, etc.), the data will be encrypted.This means that the last node (the exit node) can see everything you do on HTTP sites, and can steal your passwords if they are transmitted unencrypted.Many people become exit nodes just so they can view this information -- Tor is much more dangerous than open WiFi for snooping!The encryption arrangement described above ensures that no single Tor node knows both the sender and the destination.Relay1 and your ISP know that you are using Tor and sending a packet at a certain time, but they don't know what you're sending or who you're sending to.

Relay3 knows exactly what you're sending, but he can't determine who is sending it because Relay2 and Relay1 are blocking him.All three relays need to work together in order to conclusively connect the sender and the destination.However, Tor is weak to a timing attack that allows only two participants in certain positions to determine the sender with high accuracy.Consider this Tor connection: If the sender's ISP (S-ISP) and the destination are working together, they can record the size and times of packets sent and received.Over a large number of packets, they can determine with very high accuracy that the sender is, in fact, the person sending packets to the destination.This requires active surveillance or detailed logging by both sides.Relay1 can also perform the same role as S-ISP.Additionally, more configurations are possible if the underlying connection is not encrypted (normal HTTP, for example): This second set can always see that the sender is connected to the destination, but they can only see what the sender is doing on the site if the connection is not encrypted.

(Pathnames are encrypted in HTTPS.)Because the first relay (the entry node) is a weak point in the connection, Tor takes certain defensive measures.When you first start Tor, it chooses three entry guards that don't change for the entire time that you run Tor.You will always use one of those three unless one goes down.If all of those nodes are safe and your ISP is safe, then you are OK.These timing attacks are of special importance to Bitcoin because anyone can be the "destination" in a connection.Packets are broadcast to every peer in the Bitcoin network.This might allow your ISP alone to associate your transactions to you without much difficulty.However, a timing attack relies on receiving at least several dozen packets from the sender, so the "destination" might actually have to be one of your direct Bitcoin peers.It's not too difficult to flood the Bitcoin network with peers, though.Because of this attack, it is wise to use an EWallet instead of the Bitcoin client when using Tor.To discover Tor relays, Tor uses a centralized directory server model.

There are nine authoritative directory servers.To become a relay, you register with one of these.The directory servers share their data and produce a network status consensus document every so often containing all Tor nodes.Tor clients don't connect directly to the authoritative directory servers -- they connect to one of many directory mirrors, which have a copy of the network status consensus.Since there is no peer-to-peer bootstrap mechanism in Tor, the entire network can be destroyed if half of the authoritative directory servers are destroyed, and the entire network can be subverted if half of the authoritative directory servers become evil.Hidden services allow both the sender and destination to remain anonymous.A hidden service connection is made like this: For clients, hidden services are more secure than encrypted Tor HTTPS connections because: Running a hidden service is more dangerous, however.A simple intersection attack can be performed by the hidden service's ISP alone: The same sort of timing attacks as above are also possible.